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ARTICLES
RELIEF FOR IP RIGHTS INFRINGEMENT IS
PRIMARILY EQUITABLE: '
HOW AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION IS SHORTCHANGING THE 21ST CENTURY CORPORATE
LITIGATOR
Charles E. Rounds, Jr.t
Abstract
This article examines the equitable remedy of restitution for
unjust enrichment in the IP rights infringement context. Instruction in
Equity's "notion" of unjust enrichment and the remedy for it was
f Charles E. Rounds, Jr. is a tenured professor of law at Suffolk University Law School in
Boston and the senior author of sixteen editions of LORING AND ROUNDS: A TRUSTEE'S
HANDBOOK, which has been cited in numerous judicial decisions and articles, as well as cited
and excerpted multiple times in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS. CCH also has
incorporated the handbook into several of its electronic products. He has twice testified before
Congress on trust-related matters. In July 2007, the NYU Journal of Law and Business
published Publicly-Traded Open End Mutual Funds in Common Law and Civil Law
Jurisdictions:A Comparison of Legal Structures. The law review article was co-authored by
Prof. Rounds and Andreas Dehio (Heidelberg University, Germany). In 2008, the Baylor Law
Review published Lawyer Codes are Just About Licensure, the Lawyer's Relationship with the
State: Recalling the Common Law Agency, Contract, Tort, Trust, and Property Principlesthat
Regulate the Lawyer-Client Relationship. Prof. Rounds was the sole author of that article. In
2009 the University of Richmond Law Review published his The Common Law Is Not Just
About Contracts: How Legal Education Has Been Short-ChangingFeminism. Also in 2009, the
Wisconsin International Law Journal published his State Common Law Aspects of the Global
Unwindings of the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and the Sub-Prime Mortgage Securitization Debacle.
For over thirty years, Prof. Rounds, an Academic Fellow of the American College of Trust and
Estate Counsel (ACTEC), Resident Fellow of the Beacon Hill Institute (BHI), and Chairman of
the Board of The Tuerck Foundation for the Study of Economics, Law, and the Humanities, has
been writing about, as well as lecturing and consulting on, fiduciary issues, particularly social
investing, social security partial privatization, the legal structuring of mutual funds, and the
marginalization of the fiduciary relationship in the American law school curriculum. On
numerous occasions he has served as a litigation consultant and/or expert witness with a focus
on the fiduciary principle and equitable remedies. Prof. Rounds' full biography may be obtained
at
located
page,
web
faculty
his
visiting
by
http://law.suffolk.edu/faculty/directories/faculty.cfm?InstructorlD=49.
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once standardfare in the American law school. That is no longer the
case, even though "[a]s the American economy completes its
transition to a data economy, unjust enrichment in equity will
increasingly become the principal remedy to protect economic
interests. "* Law school-sponsored litigation clinics are fine, but not
at the expense of basic doctrine. Though this primer covers critical
common law doctrine that every IP rights litigator needs to have
internalized, the term common law being employed broadly in
juxtaposition to the civil law tradition, a primer is no substitute for
systematic instruction in Equity's institutions and remedies; the core
fiduciary relationships of agency and trust; and the fiduciary
principlegenerally. Particularlyin the IP rights infringement context,
"restitution principles serve to illuminate legislative purpose; to
identify the points at which a given statute varies a rule that would
otherwise obtain at common law; and as an aid to interpretationof a
doubtful case. "**
INTRODUCTION
Unjust enrichment can be either an equitable or a legal wrong.'
Restitution and injunction are Equity's principal remedies for that
wrong. 2 Whether in Equity or at law, unjust enrichment is the basic
principle on this side of the Atlantic that underlies the remedy of
restitution, both generally and in the context of IP rights
infringement. In this article, intellectual property (IP) is employed as
an umbrella term not only for property rights that flow from
authorized monopolies on certain "creations of the mind" such as
copyright, patent, and trademark,4 but also from "comparable rights to
control the use of any idea, expression, information, image,
designation, or the like."' Rights to websites, confidential
information, and data files would qualify under this broad definition
* See generally George P. Roach, Counting the Beans: Unjust Enrichment and the Defendant's
Overhead, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 483, 485 (2008).
** RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).

1.

§ 42

cmt.

a, at 86

Andrew Kull, James Bar Ames and the Early Modern History of Unjust Enrichment,

25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 297 (2005).

§ 136

2.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

3.

Edwin W. Patterson, Book Review, 47 YALE L.J. 1420, 1421 (1938) (reviewing

cmt. a (1937).

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (1937)).
4.
See generally ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 1 (2003).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 42 cmt. a
5.
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).

2010]

RELIEF FOR IP RIGHTS INFRINGEMENT

315

of IP.6 These rights, however, have to be enforceable in some court.
There can be no unjust enrichment "unless the defendant has obtained
a benefit in violation of the claimant's right to exclude others from the
interest in question."7
The equitable remedy of restitution for unjust enrichment has
been the American legal tradition's principal remedy for the
infringement of IP rights. 8 "As the American economy completes its
transition to a data economy, [it] will increasingly become the
principal remedy" for the infringement of "economic interests"
generally, at least on this side of the Atlantic. 9 Even the Federal
statutes that define and regulate IP monopolies generally defer to
and/or codify traditional principles of Equity when it comes to
fashioning remedies for IP rights infringement. 10 There are some
exceptions: "The most notable departure from restitution principles
concerns the available remedies for patent infringement. The Patent
Act of 1946 has been interpreted (although only since 1964) to
foreclose a claim by the patentee to disgorgement of the infringer's
profits.""
One who is unjustly enriched is unjustifiably enriched, that is to
say there is no legal or equitable basis for the enrichment.12 The
donee of a valid gift is not unjustly enriched, absent special facts.'
Neither is the party to a valid contract, absent special facts.14 Neither
is a judgment creditor who has prevailed in a properly brought tort

6. George P. Roach, Counting the Beans: Unjust Enrichment and the Defendant's
Overhead, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 483, 485-85 (2008).
7.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§

42 cmt. b

(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
8. Roach, supranote 6, at 584-85.
9. Id. at 485.
10.

See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 42 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) ("The restitution claim described in § 42 will thus
rarely be asserted without reference to statute, but it retains independent significance for a
number of reasons. When they authorize restitutionary remedies-the most important in this
context being the accounting for profits-the statutes in question codify, with modifications, the
rule of this Section. Restitution principles serve to illuminate legislative purpose; to identify the

points at which a given statute varies a rule that would otherwise obtain at common law; and as
an aid to interpretation in doubtful case.").
11.
Id. § 42 cmt. c.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1, cmt. b
12.
(Discussion Draft, 2000).
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 112 (1937). See also Id. § 1, cmt. b.
13.
14. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §
1, cmt. b (Discussion Draft, 2000).
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action.15 On the other hand, one who by gift, contract, or judicial
process procures an economic benefit fraudulently is unjustly
enriched.' 6 So also is one who comes into possession of another's
property by mistake.' 7 A classic example of the latter is when a bank,
by mistake, credits a checking account with a certain amount, perhaps
as the result of a computer glitch.' 8 The bank is entitled to debit the
account for an equivalent amount.' 9 If it were not the case, the owner
of the account, even when innocent, would be unjustly enriched at the
expense of the bank. There was no contractual basis for the deposit.
Nor did the bank intend to make a gift to the account holder, and
likely would not have had the authority to do so in any case.
The concept of restitution for unjust enrichment is a thread that
is woven prominently throughout the entire fabric of the AngloAmerican legal tradition.20 It is also the principal monetary remedy
for the infringement of IP rights in the 21st Century.21 In one popular
IP hornbook, however, it is mentioned only once, specifically in the
context of a discussion of monetary relief for trademark infringement,
and obliquely at that.22 The authors refer to unjust enrichment without
explanation as a "notion" and then move on, presumably on the
mistaken assumption that most of their readers will be versed in core
Equity doctrine.23 While the assumption might have been warranted at
one time, it is no longer. In 1879, Harvard Law School required that
its students take 3 year hours of Equity, 1 year hour of Agency, and 2
year hours of Trust, a "year hour" being one hour per week per
academic year. 24 "A survey of the American law-school curriculum in

15. Id.
16. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 128, cmt. d (1937).
17. Id. § 59. cmt. a (1937).
18. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 6, cmt. b,
illus. 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) ("A instructs B bank to make an electronic funds transfer
to C bank for the account of D. B transmits funds with garbled instructions to C, in consequence
of which C credits the funds to the account of E. W withdraws the funds. B has a claim of
restitution against E"). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 6, cmt. b, illus. 4 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) ("As the result ofa clerical error,
Insurer remits $50,000 to Policyholder. Policyholder had made no claim under the policy, and
no payment was due. Insurer has a claim in restitution against Policyholder to recover the
mistaken payment").
19. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 22 (1937).
20. See generally RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, 5-9 (1937).
21.
See Roach, supranote 6, at 484-85.
22. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 4, at 768.
23. See generally Id.
24. E. GORDON GEE & DONALD W. JACKSON, FOLLOWING THE LEADER? THE
UNEXAMINED CONSENSUS IN LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA 18 (1975).
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the year 1907-1908 reported that a separate course in QuasiContracts," the law side of the unjust enrichment equation, was being
offered at 30 of 49 'Leading Law Schools,' typically as a onesemester course for two hours a week." 25
Things began to unravel in the 1960's. Today, none of these
courses are on the required side of the Harvard Law School
curriculum. 2 6 Trusts as a discrete course survives, but on the elective
side of the curriculum inappropriately linked to Estates.2 7 And as
Harvard went, so went the nation. 2 8 It has been ever thus.2 9 Now,
Equity, the trust and agency relationships, and the fiduciary principle
generally are common law "notions" to be acquired by osmosis in a
course on the lawyer's Code of Professional Conduct30 or the
statutory trust-agency hybrid known as the corporation; or perhaps in
a course on the Investment Company Act of 194031; or, failing that, in
some bar review cram course. This marginalization has not been
without consequences: Though restitution is an "essential and
nuanced common law area," it is now the case that these days "many"
lawyers, judges, and even professors are "misunderstanding" and
"misstating" basic restitution principles. 3 2
The term common law has meant different things in different
times, to include the following: (1) The "law in force in all of the
Kingdom of England, as distinguished from local customary law
25. Kull,, supra note 1, at 298-99 (citing H. L. Wilgus, Legal Education in the United
States, 6 MICH. L. REV. 647, tbl.VI (following page 678) (1908)).
(2010),
Program
J.D.
School:
Law
26. Harvard
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/degrees/jd/index.html; Harvard Law School Graduation
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/registrar/policies(2010),
Checklist
forms/graduationchecklist2009- I0.pdf.
(2010),
Courses
School:
Law
27. Harvard
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/courses/200910?words=Trusts&schedblock=&term=&subject-; Harvard Law School: Description of Trusts
and Estates Course (2010), http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/courses/2009-10/?id=6745.
28. See generally GEE & JACKSON, supranote 24, at 14-15, 22-25, 47-48.
29. See generally id. It was, after all, Prof. William A Keener who began the process of
spreading the case method of instruction beyond the confines of Harvard Yard upon assuming
the deanship of Columbia Law School in 1890. See Kull, supra note 1, at 306.
30. See generally Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Lawyer Codes Are Just About Licensure, the
Lawyer's Relationship with the State: Recalling the Common Law Agency, Contract, Tort, Trust
and Property Principlesthat Regulate the Lawyer-Client FiduciaryRelationship, 60 BAYLOR L.
REV. 771, 776 (2008).
31. See generally Charles E. Rounds, Jr. & Andreas Dehio, Publicly-Traded Open End
Mutual Funds in Common Law and Civil Law Jurisdictions:A Comparison of Legal Structure,
3 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 374 (2007).
32. Doug Rendleman, Restating Restitution: The Restatement Process and Its Critics, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 933, 936 (2008).

318

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 26

peculiar to a limited area, such as the custom of the county of Kent"
during the medieval period;33 (2) "Judge-made law-judicial
precedents-as distinguished from statutes enacted by Parliament or
some other legislature"; 34 (3) "The law applied by the former royal
courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer, as
distinguished from the canon law applied by the ecclesiastical courts
and the rules of equity administered by the High Court of
Chancery"; 35 and (4) "The law of those areas which have systems of
private law derived from and more or less resembling the law in force
in the Kingdom of England when it merged in the Kingdom of Great
Britain (1 May 1707)."
When the term common law is employed in this article, it is
usually employed in the broad fourth sense to distinguish the trust
from analogous civil law institutions on the Continent and elsewhere
that are creatures of all-inclusive codification.3 7 It is said that Equity
is not separate and apart from the common law as that term is
understood in its broadest sense, but a gloss or a collection of
appendices to the common law. "Equity without common law would
have been a castle in the air, an impossibility."38 By way of example,
"[e]quity accepts the common law ownership of the trustee, but
regards it as against conscience for him to exercise that legal
ownership otherwise than for the benefit of the cestui que trust, and
therefore engrafts the equitable obligation upon him." 39 But it would
also not be correct to suggest that the procedural blending of law and
equity, the consequence of a law reform movement that began on this
side of the Atlantic in the middle of the 1 9th century, 40 has lead to the
33.

6 WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, Chapter 11: Trust, in INT'L ENCYC. COMP. L. 5 (F. H.

Lawson ed., 1973).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. Such areas would include "the British Isles (except Scotland), the United States of
America (except the State of Louisiana and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico), Canada (except
the Province of Quebec), Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Liberia, and some of the
present and former British colonies and possessions in Africa, the West Indies and elsewhere."
Id.
37. See generally CHARLES E. ROUNDS, JR. & CHARLES E. ROUNDS, Ill, LORING AND
ROUNDS: A TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK

§ 8.12.1

(2010 ed.) [hereinafter LORING & ROUNDS] (civil

law alternatives to the trust); see generally Rounds & Dehio, supra note 31.
38. FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY: ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON
LAW 19, (A. H. Chaytor & W. J. Whittaker eds.) ("We ought not to think of common law and
equity as of two rival systems. Equity was not a self-sufficient system; at every point it
presupposed the existence of the common law.").
39. G. W. KEETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EQUITY 95 (6th ed., 1965).
40. Michael Lobban, Preparingfor Fusion: Reforming the Nineteenth-Century Court of
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elimination of the substantive distinctions between the two "common
law" regimes. Had that happened, a wholesale abolition of the law of
trusts would have resulted.4 1 It did not. Here, I am employing the term
common law in its narrower sense: "Judge-made law-judicial
precedents-as distinguished from statutes enacted by Parliament or
some other legislature." 42 Restitution for unjust enrichment in the IP
context is still an equitable remedy when it comes to the
disgorgement of profits, 4 3 and breaches of fiduciary duty in the
agency context are still enforced in Equity, not at law.44
The marginalization of Equity in the American law school
curriculum, particularly the agency, the trust, and the fiduciary
principle generally, is not doing any favors for the aspiring IP rights
infringement litigator. I have already noted the central role that
equitable restitution for unjust enrichment is now playing in 21st
century IP rights infringement litigation. But it gets worse. In the
landmark case of Root v. Railway Co., (1881), the U.S. Supreme
Court endorsed the practice of treating the infringer of a patent right
"as though he were a trustee ... for the patentee" for purposes of
accounting for profits realized incident to the infringement. 45 It is
asking a lot of an IP course instructor to cover the fundamentals of
Equity and the law of Trusts, as well as the Federal statutes that grant
limited monopolies in certain creations of the mind. And it is asking
an awful lot of his or her students to appreciate, for example, why a
patent infringer is not analogous to a trustee de son tort.4 6 Years ago
this all would have been covered in the required courses on the
agency, contract, and trust relationships; the bundle of rights known
as property; the tort; and Equity and the fiduciary principle

Chancery, Part 11, 22 LAW & HIST. REv. 565, 584 (noting that "the key political impetus for

fusion came from America").
41. See MAITLAND, supra note 38, at 16-18.
42.

FRATCHER, supranote 33.

43.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

44.

HAROLD GREVILLE HANBURY & RONALD HARLING MAUDSLEY, MODERN EQUITY

§ 136 cmt. a

(1937).

518 (10" ed. 1976) (confirming that it is a default rule of Equity that an agent may not self-deal
with property that is the subject of the agency).
45. Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 214 (1881). In Root, the Plaintiff brought an action in
equity only for damages related to infringement of a patent that had already expired by the time
of the suit. This lead the Court to reject the Plaintiffs equity claim because in this unusual
circumstance, he had "a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law." Id. at 190. However, the
court endorsed the general rule that when Equity applies the infringer is treated as a trustee and
owes a plaintiff an accounting of profits. Id. at 214.
46. See Id. at 215 (suggesting that a patent infringer is not a trustee de son tort because
the subject property had not been impressed with a trust prior to the infringement).
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generally. 47 These are all facets of the common law as enhanced by
Equity, the foundation upon which all our statutory and regulatory
edifices are constructed.
This article is the fifth in a series of articles that consider the
implications of the marginalization of Equity in the American legal
academy. In Publicly-Traded Open End Mutual Funds in Common
Law and Civil Law Jurisdiction:A Comparison of Legal Structures,
we explained how the Investment Company Act of 1940, which
regulates mutual funds, tweaks the common law of agency and trusts
at the margins but otherwise leaves it undisturbed. 8 In other words,
the Act would be gibberish without the common law. Securities
lawyers take note.
In Lawyer Codes Are Just About Licensure, the Lawyer's
Relationship with the State: Recalling the Common Law Agency,
Contract, Tort, and Trust Principles That Regulate the Lawyer-Client
Fiduciary Relationship I questioned why instruction in the lawyer's
Code of Professional Conduct is mandatory in most law schools while
instruction in the law of agency is generally not, particularly in light
of the fact that the lawyer-client relationship is first and foremost one
of agency.
In The Common Law Is Not Just About Contracts: How Legal
Education Has Been Short-ChangingFeminism I endeavored to make
the case that the private side of the legal ledger, the common
law/Equity side, has been chronically under-examined by feminist
scholars, particularly as a vehicle for empowering and protecting
women economically.50 We laid the blame for this under-utilization of
existing legal doctrine squarely at the doorstep of the American law
school, whose core curriculum is now structured around the
simplistic, one-dimensional "private contract versus state regulation"
narrative.
And in State Common Law Aspects of the Global Unwindings of
the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and the Sub-Prime Mortgage Securitization
Debacle I suggested that globalizing the American law school
curriculum at the expense of instruction in core common law doctrine
can have the perverse effect of making that curriculum even more

47. GEE & JACKSON, supra note 27, at 19-22 (comparing core law school curricula from
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s).
48. Rounds & Dehio, supra note 34, at 473 passim.
49. Rounds, supra note 33,.passim.
50. Charles E. Rounds, Jr., The Common Law Is Not Just About Contracts: How Legal
Education Has Been Short-Changing Feminism, 43 U. RICH. L. REv. 1185 passim (2009).
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provincial than it has already become.
Section I of this article serves as a general Equity primer, with a
focus on equitable remedies. Section II zeros in on equitable remedies
in the IP infringement context, particularly restitution for unjust
enrichment. Though restitution for unjust enrichment straddles law
and Equity, IP rights infringement is primarily in Equity's bailiwick.
Because an IP rights infringer is deemed to be a common law trustee
for purposes of assessing liability, 52 Section II also serves as primer
on the trust, the trust being an institution which centuries ago
essentially evolved from an application of the equitable remedy of
specific performance.
I. A GENERAL EQUITY PRIMER
A. Equity's Common Law Context
Anglo-American common law in its parochial sense derives from
"[t]he law applied by the former courts of King's Bench, Common
Pleas and Exchequer, as distinguished from the canon law applied by
the ecclesiastical courts and the rules of equity administered by the
High Court of Chancery."53 The contract is a common law legal
relationship.54 So is the agency, although an agent may be liable in
Equity to the principal for a breach of fiduciary duty.5 ' A fee simple is
a common law property right, although the beneficiaries of a trust also
have property rights. 6 However, such property rights of a trust are
recognized and enforced in Equity." The trust is not a creature of the
common law in its parochial sense. It essentially evolved out of an

51.
Charles E. Rounds, Jr., Rounds, State Common Law Aspects of the Global
Unwindings of the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and the Sub-Prime Mortgage Securitization Debacle:
Butressing the Thesis that Globalizing the American Law School Curriculum at the Expense of
Instruction in Core Common Law Doctrine Will Only Further Provincialize It, 27 WISC. INT'L.
L.J. 99 passim (2009).
52. Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 214 (1881).
53. 6 WILLIAM. F. FRATCHER, Chapter 11: Trust, in INT'L ENCYC. CoMP. L. 5 (F. H.
Lawson ed., 1973).
54. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScOrT ET AL., SCOrr & ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 2.3.10.3 (5th ed.
2006) [hereinafter I ScOTT & ASHER] ("the beneficiary of a trust traditionally enforced his or
her rights by a proceeding in equity, while the beneficiary of a contract traditionally pursued an
action at law").
55. SNELL'S EQUITY 1 19-18 (John McGhee ed., 31st ed. 2005) [hereinafter SNELL'S
EQUITY].
56. See generally LORING AND ROUNDS, supra note 40, § 5.3 (the trust beneficiary's
property interest).
57. SNELL'S EQUITY, supranote 55,9] 19-18.
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equitable remedy.s8
B. Equity's Origins.
As noted, Equity is not separate and apart from the common law
as that term is understood in its broadest sense but actually a gloss on
or collection of appendices to the common law, the common law in
its broadest sense being "[t]he law of those areas which have systems
of private law derived from and more or less resembling the law in
force in the Kingdom of England when it merged in the Kingdom of
Great Britain (I May 1707)."6o Massachusetts, Virginia, Australia,
New Zealand, and the Canadian province of Ontario are just some of
the jurisdictions which have such systems of private law. By way of
example, "Equity accepts the common law ownership of the trustee,
but regards it as against conscience for him to exercise that legal
ownership otherwise than for the benefit of the cestui que trust
[beneficiary], and therefore engrafts the equitable obligation upon
him." 61 Abuses of the legal agency relationship, as well as breaches of
trust, are subject to equitable remedies.62
Besides adding to Anglo-American jurisprudence the institution
of the trust, Equity has also contributed two novel and fertile remedies
of specific performance and injunction. Ultimately, however, Equity
will do whatever it takes to make an injured party whole, to include
the assessment of damages. Whereas a judgment at law declared the
plaintiffs rights, a decree in Equity imposed duties on the defendant.
65
In other words, equity acted and still acts in personam.

58. See generally LORING & ROUNDS, supra note 40 (by the early 15' century the
English courts of equity were enforcing uses).
59.
SNELL'S EQUrry, supra note 55, 11-03.
60. 6 WILLIAM. F. FRATCHER, Chapter II: Trust, in INT'L ENCYC. CoMP. L. 6 (F. H.
Lawson ed., 1973).
61.
KEETON, supra note 42, at 95.
62. See, e.g., SNELL'S EQUITY, supra note 55, 1 7-127 (an agent who engages in
unauthorized self dealing with the principal's property must account to the principal for any
incidental profits received by the agent).
63.
F. W. MAITLAND, EQUITY 21-22 (A. H. Chaytor & W. J. Whittaker eds., 1909). But
see George L. Gretton, Trusts Without Equity, 49 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 599, 618 (2000)
(provocatively asserting that "[i]t is important that lawyers in the civil law tradition understand
that the trust is not a 'unique institution' and has no necessary connection with equity").
64. SNELL'S EQUITY, supra note 55, TJ18-09 ("[Tlhe court has jurisdiction to make a
monetary award in equity in cases where there has been a breach of an equitable duty, or where
equity recognizes a duty to account").
65. See HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 44, at 15 ("The key to understanding the
nature of equitable remedies is the appreciation of the importance of the maxim that 'Equity acts
in personam.' This has been the basis of the jurisdiction from the earliest days; and is so
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Equity has given us as well a number of detached doctrines: the
so-called Equity maxims, which, though critically relevant in the real
world, were decades ago tossed out of the Ivory Tower.66 One of
these maxims, "He who seeks equity must do equity," underpins any
off-set rights an IP infringer may have.67 There are valuable nuggets
hidden among these discarded doctrines just waiting to be found and
exploited by the creative civil litigator. The judicial supervision of the
administration of decedents' estates is another of Equity's
contributions, a topic well beyond the scope of this article.
Rights, duties, and obligations that are equitable in nature have
their origins in the principles, standards, and rules developed by
English courts of chancery. 69 Thus, to truly understand Equity one
needs to have some understanding of what these courts are and how
they came to be. The Equity saga actually begins in thirteenth century
England. It is a saga whose themes nonetheless should resonate with
2 1 st century owners of IP rights:
[I]n the rough days of the thirteenth century, a plaintiff was often
unable to obtain a remedy in the common law courts, even when
they should have had one for him, owing to the strength of the
defendant, who would defy the court or intimidate the jury. Either
deficiency of remedy or failure to administer it was a ground for
petition to the King in Council to exercise his extraordinary
judicial powers. A custom developed of referring certain classes of
these petitions to the Chancellor, and this custom was confirmed
by an order of Edward II in 1349. The Chancellor acted at first in
the name of the King in Council, but in 1474 a decree was made on
his own authority, and this practice continued, so that there came
to be a Court of Chancery as an institution independent of the King
and his Council. 70
The Lord Chancellor, usually a clergyman, was the officer
responsible for keeping the Great Seal of England, and was a close
adviser of the monarch. 7' Only in 1362, well after the Norman

today").
66. See LORING & ROUNDS, supra, note 40, § 8.12 (cataloging some critical Equity
maxims, as well as highlighting in the footnoting some of their 21 century applications).
67. See infra Part II.
68. See SNELL'S EQUrrY, supra note 55, N29-02, 29-03.
69. 1 Scorr & ASCHER, supra note 57, § 1.1.
70. SNELL'S EQUITY, supranote 55, 1 1-08.
71. The Chancellor was a member of the monarch's private or "privy" council. See John
deP. Wright, The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 363, 363-65
(2007).

324

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 26

invasion, did the Lord Chancellor, who to this day outranks the Prime
Minister in official precedence, begin addressing Parliament in
English rather than in French. 72 The chancery scribes were
responsible for the monarch's paperwork. It is said that "[t]he
genealogy of modern Standard English goes back to Chancery, not
Chaucer."73 As keeper of the King's (or Queen's) Conscience, the
Lord Chancellor was once the chief judge of the Court of Chancery.
In England, with the Judicature Acts 1873 and 1875 to be exact, the
High Court of Chancery was merged with the common law courts, the
common law judges then being given the power to administer

Equity. 74
Now to this side of the Atlantic. After the American Revolution,
the thirteen original states adopted substantially the entire common
law of England. This included, with little change, its system of Equity
jurisprudence, of which the institution of the trust was an integral
part.75 Massachusetts was the last hold-out, not fully recognizing
Equity as a complementary part of its judicial system until 1877.76
Thus, in some parts of the United States, most notably Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania, there was actually a time when beneficiaries could
bring breach-of-contract-type legal actions against trustees.77
In most states, with the notable exception of Delaware, there are
no longer separate courts of law and Equity. 78 The consolidation,
however, has left intact the differences between legal property
interests and equitable property interests, 79 between legal remedies

72. See generally LORING & ROUNDS, supra note 40,
phenomenon of "Law French").
73.

(1995).
74.
75.

§ 8.15

(discussing in part the

DAVID CRYSTAL, THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 41

See HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 44, at 13-14.
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

§6

(rev. 2d ed.

Supp. 1984).
76. Edwin H. Woodruff, Chancery in Massachusetts, XX L.Q. REV. 370, 383-84 (1889).
See also I SCoTT & ASCHER, supra note 57, § 1.9.
77.

4 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCoTT ET AL., SCOTT & ASCHER ON TRUSTS

§ 24.1.2

(5th ed.

2007) [hereinafter 4 SCOTT & ASHER].
78. Morton Gitelman, The Separation of Law and Equity and the Arkansas Chancery
Courts: Historical Anomalies and PoliticalRealities, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 215, 244
(1995) ("Only four states, Arkansas, Delaware, Mississippi, and Tennessee, still have separate
courts of equity.") but cf John J. Watkins, The Right to Trial by Jury in Arkansas After Merger
of Law and Equity, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 649, 649 (2002) (Showing that in 2000
Arkansas merged their courts of law and equity).
79. A share of stock in a corporation would be a legal property interest. A share or
participation in a trusteed mutual fund, e.g., a fund that is sponsored by Fidelity, Vanguard, or
Bank of America, would be an equitable property interest.
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and equitable ones. The consolidation also has left intact the
substantive differences between legal duties and equitable duties.o
"An equitable duty is a duty enforceable in a court of chancery or in a
court having the powers of a court of chancery."8 1 The duties of an
agent with discretion to the principal or of a trustee to the
beneficiaries are equitable, particularly the duty not to engage in
unauthorized self-dealing.
C

EquitableRemedies

The key to understanding the nature of equitable rights is "the
appreciation of the importance of the maxim that 'Equity acts in
personam. "83 The equitable remedy of specific performance or
injunction entails an order that the defendant should do or not do
something upon threat of incarceration.84 The decree is not in rem.
From the beginning of its existence the extraordinary jurisdiction
of the Court of Chancery, based largely upon existing inadequacies
of the common law courts, was exercised in cases in which a
fiduciary had failed to perform his duties so that either he or some
third person acquired property to which the beneficiary was
entitled, and in cases in which a person, by fraud, mistake, or
duress has been deprived of property which he could not regain by
the ordinary remedies then available. 86
Tracing orders87 and imposition of constructive trust orders,88 are
said to be equitable remedies. 89 Technically, however, tracing and the
imposition of a constructive trust are not equitable "remedies":
Occasionally other processes of equity are described as equitable
remedies. The constructive trust is sometimes described thus, and
80. See generally HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 44, at 17-18 (suggesting that even
after the "fusion" of the "administration" of the regimes of law and Equity, "there is still a great
deal of difference between legal and equitable duties, in terms particularly of their
consequences").
81.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

§ 2 cmt. e

(1959).

82. SNELL'S EQUITY, supranote 55, 17-37.
83. HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 44, at 15.
84. Id. at 33 n. 9 (confirming that one who refuses to comply with a specific performance
order risks imprisonment for being in contempt of court).
85. Id. at 16.
86.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION 9 (1937).

87. See generally SNELL'S EQUITY, supra note 55, 1 28-35 (following and tracing in
equity).
88. See infra Part II.
89. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937) (categorizing the constructive
trust as an equitable remedy).
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so is the process of tracing in equity. Yet these are not so much
remedies as part of the process of establishing the substantive
rights of the parties. By holding, for example, that there is a right
to trace property and that the recipient is bound by a constructive
trust, the court is able to decide what order to make; but the tracing
and the constructive trust can hardly be said to be a "remedy," at
all events in the sense that an injunction or a decree of specific
performance is a remedy. 90
The court in the exercise of its discretionary equitable powers
may even mix a cocktail of equitable remedies. 91 If more than one
remedy is needed to make the plaintiff whole, so be it.92 In the case of
infringement of IP property rights, the cocktail is likely to be an
injunction and an accounting for incidental profits. 93 Under the
equitable doctrine of election of remedies, the plaintiff will have some
say in what the ingredients are:
Where remedies are alternative and inconsistent, a claimant must
elect between them. The election need not be made until a claimant
is able to make an informed choice, but should not be unreasonably
delayed to the prejudice of the defendant. Normally the election
should be made before judgment but, in exceptional cases, the
election may be made later than that. 94
There is, however, generally no room in equity for windfalls and
double recoveries:
There is no reason in principle, why different types of equitable
relief should not be granted in respect of the same breach of
equitable duty. Thus, a court may decree specific performance and
a pecuniary performance; it may also award compensation for any
delay in performance provided that there is a legal or equitable
duty that supports a claim for such compensation. In such cases,

90. SNELL'S EQUITY, supra note 55, 12-17.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 136, illus. 1 (1937) ("A is the owner of a
91.
trade secret, which he confides to an employee. The employee sells this to B, who knows that it
is a trade secret and that the employee is not authorized to communicate it. B uses the trade
secret in originating a new line of goods. A is entitled to a decree enjoining B from continuing to
use the trade secret and requiring him to account for the profits which he has made by its use."
Cf. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.01, Reporter's Note (2006) ("By rescinding a contract, a
principal does not lose a claim for damages against an agent when rescission alone does not
restore the principal's position").
92. SNELL'S EQUrry, supra note 55, 1 18-24 (noting that equitable remedies are to be
regarded as being cumulative rather than alternative, subject only to the proscription against
double recoveries); HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 44, at 60-61 (damages in addition to
specific performance)
93.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

94.

SNELL'S EQuITY, supra note 55,

§ 136, illus.

2 (1937).

18-22 (31' ed. 2005).
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the only limitation on the remedies will be that double recovery is
to be avoided. As a result, in many cases, equitable remedies are to
be regarded as being cumulative rather than alternative. 95

D. The EquitableAccounting Action
In appropriate circumstances, Equity may order one in
possession of property belonging to another to account to the Court
for the property, even if the possession is in violation of merely a
legal duty. 9 6 Having obtained an accounting, the Court may order the
property returned to its rightful owner pursuant to a restitution order
should it be found that the property is wrongfully in the hands of the
accountant.9 7 The Court also may enjoin the accountant from
continuing the wrongful activity.98 Usually, accounting actions lie in
the context of breaches of fiduciary duty, particularly in the agency
and trust contexts: "Save in exceptional cases, the right to an account
is dependent upon the existence of a fiduciary relationship. . . As a
result, no account can be obtained by a customer against his banker,
since the relation between them is in no sense fiduciary and is merely
that of debtor and creditor." 99 On the other hand, though the infringer
of another's IP rights is usually not in a fiduciary relationship with the
victim, Equity will in this instance entertain a complaint for an
accounting.' 00 IP rights infringement is one of those exceptional
cases. "The usual method of seeking restitution is by a [complaint] in
equity, with a request for an accounting for any profits which have
been received."' 0 '

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. 118-24.
Id. 118-06.
Id.
Id. 18-07.
Id. 18-05.
But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 42,

cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005) (noting that "many claims based on profitable interference
with a trade secret might be brought instead within the terms of § 43, because the unauthorized
disclosure of a trade secret often involves a breach of fiduciary duty"). In one English case
involving the unauthorized exploitation of a technical idea communicated in confidence to the
defendants, the court in the exercise of its equitable powers assessed damages against the
defendants, though Equity's usual remedies in such situations would have been an injunction
coupled with an order that the defendants account for their incidental profits). See Seager v.
Copydex Ltd., [19671 1 W.L.R. 923 (Eng.).
101. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 136, cmt. a (1937). See, e.g., Christensen v. Nat'l
Brake & Electric Co., 10 F.2d 856 (1926) (the court in an accounting action being asked to sort
out how a patent infringer's ill-gotten profits should be calculated and reflected on its accounts).
English law is generally in accord. See HANBURY &MAUDSLEY, supra note 44, at 20
(confirming that Equity's "familiar remedies" for IP rights infringement are "an injunction and
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E. Accountingfor One's Unjust Enrichment
Unjust enrichment can be either an equitable or a legal wrong. 102
When it is an equitable wrong, restitution and injunction are the
typical remedies for that wrong.10 3 When one is unjustly enriched, the
ability to follow the subject property or trace the economic value will
have a bearing on the type of equitable remedy that is fashioned.104 It
is said that tracing is concerned with the same person but different
assets whereas following is concerned with the same asset but
different persons. 1o Where a trustee, for example, has in breach of
trust transferred a trust asset to a third party, the beneficiary has a
choice to make: "He may either follow the original asset and enforce
his equitable title to the original asset, or trace into the substituted
asset in the hands of the trustee and enforce a proprietary remedy
against it."' 0 6 In the Restatement of Restitution (1937) tracing is
referred to as "following property into its product."10 7
Where tracing or following is not appropriate, such as is
generally the case where one's intangible IP rights are being
wrongfully exploited by another, then an injunction coupled with an
equitable damage award keyed to incidental profits may be the
appropriate cocktail of equitable remedies:
[T]here are significant instances of liability based on unjust
enrichment that do not involve the restoration of anything the
claimant previously possessed. Salient examples include cases
involving the disgorgement of profits, or other benefits wrongfully
08
obtained, in excess of the plaintiffs loss.
1. Restitution
Perhaps the American Law Institute's project to restate the law
of restitution for unjust enrichment has been mis-titled.' 09 Its first
an account").
102. Kull, supra note 1, at 297-319.
103. Id.
104.
SNELL'S EQUITY, supra note 55, 1 28-35. See also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
ch. 13 (1937) (chapter heading entitled "Following Property into its Product").
105. JOHN MOWBRAY, ET AL., LEWIN ON TRUSTS T41-05 (17th ed. 2000).
106. SNELL'S EQUITY, supra note 55, 128-36.
107.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, ch. 13 (1937) (chapter heading entitled "Following
Property into its Product").
108.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§

1, Cmt. C

(Discussion Draft, 2000).
109. See generally Kull, supra note 1, at 318 (suggesting that the title Restatement of
Unjust Enrichment may have been eschewed by the authors of the first restatement out of
concern that the American Law Institute would be seen "as endorsing an open-ended charter of
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effort is entitled Restatement of the Law of Restitution: Quasi
Contracts and Constructive Trusts (1937).no The second, entitled
Restatement (Second) of Restitution, was withdrawn in 1985 after two
tentative drafts."'1 The tentative drafts of the third are collectively
entitled Restatement of the Law Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.1 12
It is respectfully suggested that a title such as Restatement of the Law
of Restitutionfor Unjust Enrichment would better impart the idea that
unjust enrichment is the wrong and restitution the primary remedy for
it. Again, unjust enrichment is the receipt of a benefit without legal
justification. "A person obtains restitution when he is restored to the
position he formerly occupied either by the return of something which
he formerly had or by the receipt of its equivalent in money." 13 In the
case of IP rights infringement, the gross measure of the restitution is
generally the value of the benefit received.1 14
2.

Injunction

An injunction is a court order issued directing a party to a
proceeding to do or refrain from doing a specified act.115 Generally a
court will not grant an injunction when monetary compensation is an
adequate remedy.11 6 "Despite early attempts, the common law courts
failed to add the injunction to their judicial armory, so that the
Chancellor had to come to the aid of those whose wrongs could not be
adequately addressed by damages."' 17 The infringement of one's IP
rights can be just such a wrong, as a damage award for past conduct,
without more, is unlikely to deter the infringer from continuing the
wrongful conduct after the final decree has been issued. Moreover,
the intangible nature of an ownership interest in IP makes it
impossible to place that interest under physical lock and key, such as
in a safe deposit box along with the Krugerrands. The Patent Act of
1952, for example, provides that the several courts having jurisdiction

liability, to be invoked in any case where 'enrichment' and 'injustice' might be thought to
coincide.").
110. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION (1937).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983);
111.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTITUTION (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1984).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Tentative Draft
112.

No. 4, 2005).
113.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. § 136 (1937).
SNELL'S EQUITY, supranote 55,
Id.
Id. T 16-05.

§ 1, cmt.
16-01.

a (1937).
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of cases under it may grant injunctions "in accordance with the
principles of equity."" 8 This is yet another example of where a
critical statute incorporates by reference a vast body of foundational
law that no longer resides on the required side of the American law
school curriculum, and in most law schools it no longer resides
prominently on the elective side, either." 9 The Investment Company
Act of 1940 is another example.12 0
II. THOUGH RESTITUION FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT
STRADDLES LAW AND EQUITY, IP RIGHTS
INFRINGMENT IS EQUITY'S BAILIWICK
At law, the concept of unjust enrichment incubated in the corner
of the common law we now refer to as quasi contracts.12 1. "That
heading includes a wide variety of situations . . . , as where a person
by mistake pays a debt a second time, or is coerced into conferring a
benefit upon another, or renders aid to another in an emergency or is
wrongfully deprived of his chattels by another who has used them for
his own benefit." 2 2 The legal remedy is generally limited to the
payment of money. 123 In Equity, the concept of unjust enrichment
evolved as a corollary to both the fiduciary principle and constructive
trust jurisprudence.12 4
The Restatement of Restitution (1937) endeavored to detach the
concept of restitution for unjust enrichment from its various cultural
roots and place it in its own vase on the shelf of the constructs of the
common law as it has been enhanced by Equity: "The task of
'restatement', in this instance, took the form of a radical reconception
of an important area of the law that antiquated formal categories had
previously obscured, following exactly in this regard the prescriptions
of some noted legal realists."125 Meanwhile, the process of disbanding

118.

35 U.S.C. §283 (2006).

119. Harvard Law School's 2009-2010 course catalog, for example, reveals only a one unit
"Law and Equity: Reading Group" on the elective side of the curriculum. HLS Courses,
http://www.law.harvard.edulacademics/courses/2009-10/?id-6757 (last visited April 15, 2010).
Presumably the fiduciary principle and equitable remedies are covered tangentially, if at all, in
courses on the contract, civil procedure, the corporation, lawyer codes, and the like.
120. See generally Rounds & Dehio, supranote 34.
121.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION 4 (1937).

122. Id. at1.
123. Id. (confirming that the subject of quasi contracts is limited to actions at law to secure
the payment of money).
124. HANBuRY &MAUDSLEY, supra note 44, at ch. 14 (the constructive trust).
125.
Andrew Kull, Restitution and Reform, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 83, 86 (2007).
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separate courts of equity was well underway on both sides of the
Atlantic, a reform movement that actually began on this side in the
middle of the nineteenth century.1 26 It would not be long before
Equity would find itself marginalized in the American law school
curriculum.127 But Equity itself never went away, as evidenced by the
ever-expanding role that the trust has been playing in the 2 1st Century
as an instrument of global commerce.128 Perhaps the only
consequence of all this "top down" academic interference in the
natural and incremental progression of the common law as enhanced
by equitable principles and institutions has been to foster sloppy legal
analysis and confusion, a predictable outgrowth of all this decontextualization.129 The High Court of Australia, a jurisdiction in
which Equity has been enjoying a rich and thorough-going
renaissance, explains, using a real world fact pattern:
Nevertheless, reflection will demonstrate that the notion of unjust
enrichment cannot be accepted as a modem synonym for a refusal
"against conscience" to pay the money in question. This is
because ... the action for money had and received lies against
defendants who fail to account but who, on any sensible
understanding of the term, have not been enriched. A recent
example ... is the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in
Martin v. Pont. A principal who entrusted money to an agent for

the purpose of investing it with a nominated finance company was
entitled to recover from the agent when, by reason of defalcation
by an employee of the agent which did not benefit the agent, the
purpose was not carried out. 130

126. Michael Lobban, Preparingfor Fusion: Reforming the Nineteenth Century Court of
Chancery, Part II, 22 L. & HIST. REV. 565, 584 (2004) (noting that the "key political impetus
for fusion came from America").
127. See GEE & JACKSON, supra note 24 at 25 (By 1969, only 22 out of a sampling of 61
American law schools were still requiring Equitable Remedies or Equity).
128. See Rounds, supra note 54, passim.
129. Doug Rendleman, Restating Restitution: The Restatement Process and Its Critics, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 933, 936 (2008) ("States, large and small, have muddled restitution
analysis or have made just plain incorrect restitution decisions. Many lawyers, judges, and
professor misunderstand and misstate basic restitution principles").
130. Roxborough v. Rothmans of Pall Mall Austl. Ltd. [2001] 208 CLR 516, 543 (Eng.)
(citing Martin v. Pont [1993] 3 NZLR 25 (Eng.)). Assumpsit for money hand and received was a
common law form of action. If money was converted, or if the subject matter had been sold by
the converter and restitution of the proceeds was sought, the common-law form of action was
"assumpsit for money had and received." See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 128, cmt. 1
(1937). "Assumpsit originated as an action of trespass on the case brought for a failure to
perform an undertaking or for performing negligently the duties of a public calling."
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION 6 (1937). As an aside, it has been suggested that the conjoining
of the synonymous participles "had," a Germanic derivative, and "received," a Latin derivative,
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The Court then went on to make some general observations
about the civil law mind set, a mind set that has particularly taken
hold in the American law school:
"Considerations such as these, together with practical experience,
suggest caution in judicial acceptance of any all-embracing theory
of restitutionary rights and remedies founded upon a notion of
'unjust enrichment.' To the lawyer whose mind has been moulded
by civilian influences, the theory may come first, and the source of
the theory may be the writing of jurists, not the decisions of judges.
However, that is not the way in which a system based on case law
develops; over time, general principle is derived from judicial
decisions upon particular instances, not the other way around."13 1
On this side of the Atlantic, there are now few left who are
equipped, by formal legal training at least, to appreciate the boldness
of the efforts of the realists, via the Restatement of Restitution (1937),
to colonize the "vast terra incognita occupied by the set of legal
actions grouped under the impenetrable name of 'quasi-contract' and
a miscellaneous set of equitable remedies (principally constructive
trust)" in that "many American lawyers would be hard pressed even
to say what equity is (or was)."1 32 The "modem" American law
school deserves the lion's share of the blame for failing to provide the
American IP litigator with the analytical tools he or she needs to
properly contextualize the critical body of law that now falls under
the general heading of "restitution for unjust enrichment." The
Restatement, itself, however, must share some of that blame, with its
"multiplicity of rules," "abstraction from context," and "artificiality of
illustrations."1 3 3 There is much that the Australians can teach the
American IP litigator.
A. IP Rights Infringement is Equity's Bailiwick.
The earliest proceedings in common law courts were
restitutionary in nature.' 34 They fell into three general categories: (1)
Seeking the recovery of land; (2) Seeking the payment of a debt, and
(3) Seeking to have a fiduciary account for a sum of money and

is an echo from a distant time when the Norman French and Saxon English languages were
fusing into modem English.
131.
Roxborough v. Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd. [2001] 208 CLR 516, 544
(Eng.).
132. Kull, supra note 125, at 87.
133. Kull, supra note 125, at 90.
134.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION 5 (1937).
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restore it to the rightful owner.' 3 5 Today, a relief at law generally
takes the form of money damages for the breach of a contract or the
commission of a tort.136 In the case of a contract breach, the equitable
remedy of specific enforcement may be available to the plaintiff to
the extent the legal remedy of damages cannot "put him in a position
as beneficial to him as if the agreement has been specifically
performed." 37 In other words, Equity's jurisdiction over the
enforcement of an express contract is based on the inadequacy of a
remedy at law. 138
Straddling the boundary of law and Equity is the remedy of
restitution in quasi contract. Recall that "[a] quasi contractual
obligation is one that is created by the law for reasons of justice,
without any expression of assent and sometimes even against a clear
expression of dissent."' 39 Is the remedy then legal or equitable? In
1760, the murkiness of Lord Mansfield's musings in the common law
case of Moses v. Macferlan touched off a debate that continues to this
day:
This kind of equitable action, to recover back money, which ought
not in justice to be kept, is very beneficial, and therefore much
encouraged. It lies only for money which, ex aequo et bono, the
defendant ought to refund ... [The action] lies for money paid by
mistake; or upon a consideration which happens to fail; or for
money got through imposition, (express or implied;) or extortion;
or oppression; or an undue advantage taken of the plaintiffs
situation, contrary to laws made for the protection of persons under
those circumstances ... In one word, the gist of this kind of action
is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is
obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the
money. 140
What was the learned justice getting at when he refrained from
capitalizing the "E" in equity? Was the action for money had and
received one in Equity, that is to say in the "Chancery sense,"' 4 1 or
135. Id.
136. See generally Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1992) ("Money damages
are, of course, the classic form of legal relief').
137. SNELL'S EQurry, supranote 55, 1 15-02.
138. Id. 15-02.
139.

ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS

§ 19,

at 27 (One Vol. ed. 1952).

Moses v. MacFerlan, (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 681 (K.B.).
See Justice Keith Mason, Chancery Bar Assoc., Inner Temple, What Has Equity to
Do
with
Restitution?
Does
It
Matter?
(Nov.
27,
2006),
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/SupremeCourt/ll_sc.nsf/pages/sCOmason271106
(speculating as to whether Lord Mansfield in this legal action "was possibly importing just a
140.
141.
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was the law somehow merely softening its rough edges with "natural
justice" and other equitable considerations? Justice Cardozo in the
1935 U.S. Supreme Court case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. State

of Florida suggested that Lord Mansfield had referred to Equity in its
Chancery sense.142 Two years later, the Restatement of the Law of
Restitution, Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts (1937) was
adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute. For good or
for ill, the Americans had elected to end run the issue, leaving the
English and the Australians to continue the debate.14 3 The debate
continues to this day, as evidenced by the enlightened musings of one
learned Australian justice:
Lord Wright is widely credited with having brought the idea of
unjust enrichment to England in the 1940s, drawing on the
principle expounded in the 1936 Restatement of the Law of
Restitution, Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts. I think
scholars now agree that the concept was first used in English
jurisprudence in an 1802 tract by Sir William Evans. It was an
"Essay on the Action for Money Had and Received", in the form
of an extended dissertation on Moses v. Macferlan. Evans cited a
civil law maxim that in translation states that it is naturally just that
one man should not be enriched to the detriment of another. In
1997, Gummow, J, a justice of the High Court of Australia and coauthor of the early editions of Meagher, Gummow and Lehand,
Equity, Doctrines and Remedies, signaled in Hill v. Van Erp at
226-227 his unhappiness with the exorbitant claims of those who
sought to pack down the whole of restitution into a tight unjust
enrichment box. His honour returned to the topic in the 2001
Roxborough case. There he cited with approval Justice Paul Finn's
statement about unjust enrichment being capable of concealing

rather than revealing why the law arrives at its outcomes.
Gummow J added arguments based on the disinterment of Lord
Mansfield's Equity in its Chancery sense.'4

For good or for ill, the rules stated in the Restatement of
Restitution (1937) were made "without reference to the question
whether the remedy is at law or in equity, except where the results

touch of Chancery law, especially with his embrace of the ideas of oppression and of taking
undue advantage").
142. Atlantic Coast Line v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 309 (1935). Cardozo suggested that a
"cause of action for restitution is a type of the broader cause of action for money had and
received, a remedy which is equitable in origin and function," id. (citing Moses v. MacFerlan,
(1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 681 (K. B.)).
143. See, e.g., Mason, supranote 141.
144. See Id.
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reached in actions at law differ in substance from those reached in
proceedings in equity."l 4 5 While to this day the issue of whether an
action in quasi-contract is legal or equitable may be unresolved, at
least in the minds of some, this cannot be said of an action to remedy
the infringement of someone's IP rights. Such an action is
unambiguously equitable because the remedy is substantively
different from a legal remedy, and from an equitable remedy incident
to a legal remedy. The difference is this: the plaintiff is entitled not
only to what the plaintiff lost but also any benefits accruing to the
infringer incident to the infringement. 14 6 Thus the infringement
damages are calculated as if the infringer were a constructive
trustee. 147 The English refer to this type of equitable remedy as a
"compensatory remedial constructive trust," which they would hasten
to add is not a trust at all.14 8 Further on in this article I suggest that
from the victim's perspective, depending upon the particular facts and
circumstances, it may be worth making the argument that an IP rights
infringer is an actual constructive trustee of the appropriated IP rights
and/or the profits that were occasioned by the infringement. 149 If the
court were to buy such an argument in a case where the infringer is
insolvent, the victim of the infringement might possibly have a leg
U.150
up.is
Equity, the guardian of "natural justice," is better suited than the
law to deal with the idiosyncrasies of IP rights infringement: "Persons
who tortiously use trade names, trade secrets, water rights, and other
similar interest of others, are ordinarily liable in tort for the harm
which they have done. In some cases, however, no harm is done, and
in these cases, if the sole remedy were by an action of tort, the
wrongdoer would be allowed to profit at little or no expense."st In
other words, were equitable relief not available for IP rights
infringement, one might be tempted to invest in such tortuous activity,
as one would need only to reimburse the rightful owner of the IP
rights for any consequential losses of the owner. The balance of the
economic benefit that had accrued to the infringer as a result of the
tortuous activity could be pocketed by the infringer. One who

145.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION 4-5 (1937).

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 553.
LEWIN ON TRUSTS, supra note 105, 17-13, at 188.
Id.
See infra Part 11(B)(3).
HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 44, at 310.

151.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION cmt. a, at 553 (1937).
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graduates from law school without a thorough grounding in Equity,
both its institutions and its remedies, will find it difficult to
competently function in the Anglo-American legal tradition, no
matter how many practical "skills" courses are on his or her
transcript. Hiring partners in IP litigation firms should take note.
B. Trust Law's Influence on IP infringement remediation
1. Introduction.
In the 1881 case of Root v. Railway Co., the U.S. Supreme Court
held that, in suits in equity for relief against the infringements of a
patent, the rule for ascertaining the infringer's profits for purposes of
computing the patentee's damages is the infringer shall be treated "as
though he were a trustee for the patentee, in respect to profits."1 5 2 For
those unversed in trusts and equitable remedies, an explanation of the
rule's common law context is in order, a context that in 1881 would
have been self-evident to anyone with a law degree. 5
An express trust, that is to say a trust that does not arise by
operation of law, is "a fiduciary relationship with respect to property,
arising from a manifestation of intention to create that relationship
and subjecting the person who holds title to the property to duties to
deal with it for the benefit of charity or for one or more persons, at
least one of whom is not the sole trustee."1 S4 As a fiduciary, a trustee
has a duty of undivided loyalty, that is, a duty to act solely in the
interests of the beneficiaries of the trust.155 While a trustee is entitled
to be reasonably compensated out of trust assets, it is default law that
the trustee may not otherwise self-deal with those assets. 15 6 Any profit
that accrues to the trustee as a result of the trustee's unauthorized selfdealing must be turned over to the trust estate.157 On the other hand,
the trustee is entitled to indemnity from the trust estate for reasonable

152. Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 214 (1881).
153. See GEE & JACKSON, supra note 24, at 18 (a Harvard Law School graduate practicing
law in 1881 would have had 3 year hours in Equity, I year hour of Agency, and 2 year hours of
Trusts under his belt, one year hour being one hour per week per academic year of formal
instruction).
154.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS

§2

(2001). It should be noted, however, that

"[blefore 1890, when the Trustee Act of 1888 came into force, many trustees who would today
be called constructive trustees were called express trustees." LEWIN ON TRUSTS, supra note 105,
at T 7-08, n. 33.
155. See generally LORING AND ROUNDS, supra note 40, at § 6.1.3.
156. Id.
157.

Id.
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expenses incurred in the course of administering the trust. 158 The
trustee, of course, has no fiduciary duty to make advances out of his
own pocket, absent special facts, but to the extent he chooses to do so,
he is entitled to take "security for indemnification."' 59 A trustee who
has made good any loss occasioned by his breach of trust is entitled to
be indemnified for expenses reasonably incurred to the extent the trust
estate is benefited thereby.160 A beneficiary who seeks equity must do

equity.161
There are two categories of "involuntary" trust relationship that
arise by operation of law: the resulting trust and the constructive trust.
The resulting trust is beyond the scope of this article. 16 2 Constructive
trust jurisprudence, on the other hand, informs the law of equitable
remedies in the IP rights infringement context either directly or
culturally. The English have developed a useful taxonomy of
constructive trusts: 16 3
Institutional Constructive

Remedial Constructive Trusts

Trusts

Trustees de
son tort

Quasi trustees

proprietary

compensatory

The institutional constructive trust arises "from some preexisting fiduciary relationship before or apart from any breach of trust
or duty."' Unless an IP rights infringer is in a fiduciary relationship
with the victim, perhaps as the victim's employee, such a trust is
beyond the scope of this article. 16 5 On the other hand, the aspiring
American IP rights litigator would do well to become familiar with
English remedial constructive trust jurisprudence. This is because the
U.S. Supreme Court justices in the Root case were grappling with
what the English refer to as the compensatory remedial constructive
trust, which one learned English commentator emphatically asserts is

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
trusts and
164.
165.

Id. § 3.5.2.3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 3.3 (discussing the resulting trust).
See LEWIN ON TRUSTS, supra note 105, at 186-188 (classification of constructive
constructive trusteeship).
Id. ati 7-11.
Id.
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not a trust at all:
It is a misnomer for a situation in which equity compels a
defendant to pay compensation to a claimant. The remedy here is
merely personal. The defendant is misleadingly said to be
compelled to 'account as constructive trustee,' but this only means
that the defendant must account as if he were, or in some manner
as, a trustee, which he is not in any sense.

As late as 1926 U.S. courts were still wrestling with this subtle
intersection of trust law and equitable remedies:
It is my understanding that the popular characterization of an
infringer as a trustee ex maleficio is referable properly to the origin
of his liability; that is, his situation is analogous to that of a trustee,
but arising through his wrong ... He is viewed as one who has
profited through wrongful appropriation of a right, and is therefore
called upon to account upon the principles applicable to one
against whom the liability to account is initially, contractually, or
by other express act or assent, created. 167

I for one am not inclined to write off the proprietary remedial
constructive trust, or an American equivalent thereof, when it comes
to IP rights infringement. A proprietary remedial constructive trust
arises "when equity requires a defendant to transfer property to a
claimant in specie otherwise than pursuant to a pre-existing trust or
fiduciary relationship."168 Certainly, more thought needs to be given
on this side of the Atlantic as to whether IP rights infringers might be
or should be deemed full-blown proprietary remedial constructive
trustees of the IP rights that they have wrongfully exploited, and
perhaps of their incidental ill-gotten gains, as well. This would be of
more than academic interest to the general creditors of an insolvent
infringer.169 Perhaps IP rights infringement is stuck in the interstices
between the proprietary and the compensatory remedial constructive
trust. If so, the practical relevance of that predicament needs to be
explored. In Section II of this article, I resurrect the issue of whether a
proprietary remedial constructive trustee is an actual trustee, the
assertions of the Restatement of Restitution (1937) to the contrary
notwithstanding.170 It is rightly-settled law on both sides of the

166. Id. at 7-13 (distinguishing the compensatory remedial constructive trust from the
proprietary remedial constructive trust).
167.
168.
169.
170.

Christensen v. Nat'1 Brake & Elec. Co., 10 F.2d 856, 861-862 (1926).
LEWIN ON TRUSTS, supra note 105, 17-13.
HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 44, at 310.
See infra Part II.
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Atlantic, however, that the compensatory remedial constructive trust
is merely a device for computing equitable damages and is not a true
trust. 171

2. The trust as an institute actually evolved from an
equitable remedy.
At this point, it is probably worth pausing to remind ourselves
again of what an express trust is. While the Americans have
endeavored to detach the constructive trust from express trust
jurisprudence, many types of constructive trusts are still considered
true trusts by the' English, and perhaps they should be again
considered so by the Americans. It is never too late to revisit the
issue.
The trust makes little sense divorced from its cultural context.172
The modem trust evolved from the English "use", which itself
evolved from an equitable remedy. An important milestone on the
road to the modem trust was reached in the early 15th century when
the English courts began enforcing "uses."173 A "use" was a transfer
of an interest in real estate from A to B for the benefit of C.174 In
other words, it was a transfer "to his use" or a son oes. A landholder,
in order to prevent the property from descending to his heirs at law, or
to deprive an overlord of his feudal rights, or to avoid Crown taxes, 175
would transfer his interest in the land to a "feoffee," a sort of paleotrustee, for the benefit of the "cestui que use," a sort of paleobeneficiary.176 Now that uses could be enforced, either the "feoffor"
(A) or the "cestui que use" (C) had a cause of action against a
"faithless feoffee" (B).177
Already by the time of the Wars of the Roses (1455-1485), most
of the land in England was held to uses.17 8 In an attempt to "put a stop
171.
HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 44, at 310-311 (Substantive Trust or Remedy:
The American View).
172. See Rounds & Dehio, supra note 34, 498-500 (comparing the English trust with the
German treuhand).
173. CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY chs. 8 &
9 (2d ed. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 67-73 (1959); 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN
SCOTT ET AL., Scorr ON TRUSTS § 1.3, 12 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter I SCOTT ON TRUTS]. For
the Roman, Germanic, and Islamic theories as to the origin of the English use, see LORING AND
ROUNDS, supra note 40, § 8.37 (the origin of the Anglo-American trust).
174. See F. W. Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 HARv. L. REv. 127 (1894-95).
175. 1 SCOrr ON TRUSTS, supra note 176, § 1.5, at 19.
176. Id. §1.3.
177. Id. § 1.4, at 14-15.
178. Id. § 1.5, at 19 (noting the extreme damage that the use had done to the feudal

340

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 26

to the drainage of royal revenues by the evasion of feudal dues
through the practice of conveying to uses," Parliament, in 1536,
enacted the Statute of Uses.1 7 9 The statute provided that title to land
held upon a use would now lodge with the "cestui que use," the
beneficiary. 80 In other words, the interest of the "cestui que use" was
converted into a legal estate or, as they say, "executed." 81 The
intention was that the title-holding "feoffee" would then be out of the
picture.182 Now the "cestui que use," the beneficiary, would have both
the legal title and the entire equitable interest.' 8 3 The beneficial owner
would have no "use" to hide behind for the purpose of avoiding taxes
and feudal obligations.' 84 At least that was how things were supposed
to work. In practice, however, the courts quickly set about de-fanging
the statute's provisions to the point where the only equitable
arrangement that did not manage to escape its snare was the passive
trust. 185

The statute was subsequently held inapplicable by the courts to
trusts where the trustee had active responsibilities.186 Those
responsibilities might be as minimal as collecting and disbursing
rents.187 And, of course, it did not apply to trusts of personal
property.88 Most trusts today fall into one or both of these categories.
The Statute of Uses also was held not to apply to a so-called use upon
a use,
a concept that at one time was much beloved by
system).
179. MOYNIHAN, supra note 173, at 203. The citation to the Statute of Uses is 27 Hen.
VIII, c. 10. (1536). See also Attomey-Gen. v. Sands, Hardres 488, 491 per Atkyns, arguendo
(1669) ("A trust is altogether the same that an use was before [the Statute of Uses], and they
have the same parents, fraud and fear; and the same nurse, a court of conscience").
1 SCoTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 176, § 1.5, at 19-20.
180.
181.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 173, at 180; 1 SCOHr & ASCHER, supra note 57, § 3.4.1, at
163.
182. MOYNIIAN, supra note 173, at 180; 1 ScoTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 176, § 1.5, at
19.
183. MOYNIHAN, supranote 173, at 180; 1 ScOrr ON TRUSTS, supra note 176, §§ 1.5, 1.6,
at 19-21.
184.
1 ScorT & ASCHER supra note 57, § 1.1, at 8.
185. Id. § 3.4.1, at 163.
186. Id. § 1.7, at 19.
187. Id.; MOYNIHAN, supra note 173, at 203. see also Id. § 3.4.2, at 164 (Under the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, a trust is active if the trustee has any affirmative duties to
perform).
188. 1 SCorT & ASCHER, supra note 57, § 1.7, at 20; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 70 (1959). Cf., I ScoTT & ASCHER, supra note 57, § 3.4.4, at 171 (noting that more recent
cases tend to hold that a passive trust of personal property is subject to execution or terminable
by the beneficiary, by analogy to the Statute of Uses or under a counterpart rule).
189. 1 Scorr & AScHERsupra note 57, § 1.7 at 21; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
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academics.190 The use upon a use is beyond the scope of this article
and of little or no practical concern for today's trustee. 191 The Statute
was held not to apply to a use raised on a term for years,192 to be
distinguished from "a use for a term of years raised on a freehold
estate."' 93 Oral trusts, resulting trusts, 194 and constructive trustsl 9 5
also managed to slip through the net. 19 6
The Statute of Uses was a critical component of a global
compromise that had been struck after extensive negotiations between
the Crown and the common law lawyers on behalf of their clients, the
realm's equitable landowners:
Part of this negotiation also included The Statute of Enrolments
(1536), 27 Hen. VIII, c. 16, which provided for registration of most
executed uses that affected land and, after a great outcry from
gentry concerned about their lost ability to leave land by will, The
Statute of Wills (1540), 32 Hen. VIII, c. 16, which permitted free
devise of all fee simple socage interests in land, and two-thirds of
the land held by knight service. The result was more legal
freedoms for landowners, subject to the enrolment of land interests
to protect the fiscal interests of the Crown. 197
The land registration system of the typical common law
jurisdiction to this day, however, remains something of a sieve. In 21 "
century Massachusetts, shares of beneficial interest in a nominee trust
of land still need not be recorded. 9 8
Prior to the Revolution, "the Statute of Uses was deemed to be in
force in the American colonies, and upon the formation of the states it
§ 71

(1959).
190. 1 SCOTT & ASCHER, supra note 57 § 1.7 at 21; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 71 (1959).
191. See generally 1 SCOTT & ASCHER, supra note 57 §3.4.5, at 173 (suggesting that "it is
doubtful whether a court today would be willing to decide a case by reference to such an odd
and hoary principle"). In any case, today it is quite permissible to fund a trust with an equitable
interest in another trust. See, 2 AUSTIN WAKEMAN ScoTr ET AL., ScoTT & ASCHER ON TRUSTS
567, § 10.7 (5th. ed. 2009).
192.
1 Scorr & ASCHER, supra note 57, § 1.7, at 20; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 70 cmt. b (1959).
193. See I Scortr & ASCHER, supra note 57, § 1.7, at 20.
194. Id. § 3.4.6, at 173.
195. Id. § 3.4.7, at 174.
196. Id. §3.4.1, at 163. See generally LORING AND ROUNDS, supra note 40, §§ 3.3, 4.1.1.1
(the constructive trust and the resulting trust).
197. DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, FRANCIS BACON 51 (1992).
198. See Louis H. Hamel, Jr., Keeping a Vacation Home in the Family for Younger
Generations,23(3) EST. PLAN. 123, 127 (Mar/Apr. 1996); see generally LORING AND ROUNDS,
supra note 40, §9.6.
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was incorporated into their legal systems as part of the common
law."' 99 Today, there are remnants of the statute scattered throughout
the United States, 20 0 although in England, the Statute of Uses itself
was repealed in 1925 by the Law of Property Act.20'
3. Assuming the IP rights infringer is a proprietary
remedial constructive trustee of the rights and/or of the
ill-gotten gains.
Certain breaches of express trust may warrant the judicial
imposition of a constructive trust. 202 Courts also employ the
constructive trust to facilitate the remedy of restitution for unjust
enrichment,203 to include affording a remedy for certain breaches of
contract: If a person comes into possession of real or personal
property as a result of fraud, undue influence, or some other such
intentional wrong,2 04 a court may order the one in wrongful
possession to hold the property not for himself or the perpetrator of
the wrong but as a constructive trustee for the person who, but for the
wrong, would have received the property.205 The proprietary remedial

199. MOYNIHAN, supra note 173, at 204.
200. Id.
201. An Act to consolidate the enactments relating to Conveyancing and the Law of
Property in England and Wales, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § I (Eng.).
202. HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 44, at 312-314 (unauthorized profit by a trustee
or fiduciary). The word "constructive" is derived from the verb "construe," not from the word
"construct."
203. If, for example, "the owner of an interest in land transfers it to another upon an oral
agreement for other land in exchange, and if the transferee relies on a statute of frauds in
refusing to perform the agreement, the transferee holds the interest thereby acquired on a
constructive trust for the transferor." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §24 cmt. d(l) (2001).
Similar relief would be available to the settlor or the intended beneficiaries had the transfer been
"in trust." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 24 cmt. g, at 354, cmt. h. In other words, the
transferee may not retain the property for himself simply because the transferor has failed to
comply with the statute of frauds. See generally, LORING AND ROUNDS, supra note 40, § 8.15.5
(Statute of Frauds).
204. 1 ScoT & ASCHER, supra note 57, § 6.11.1, at 307 (noting that "[i]f B, by a
consciously false representation of fact, induces A to transfer land to B, who orally agrees to
hold the land in trust or to reconvey it, it is clear that B may not keep the land"). See also 6
AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., ScorT & ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 43.1.1, at 2933 (5th ed.
2008).
205.
1 ScorT & ASCHER, supra note 57, §6.11.1, at 208. See, e.g., Nile v. Nile, 734
N.E.2d 1153, 1162 (Mass. 2000) (upholding the imposition of a constructive trust on the assets
of the decedent's revocable inter vivos trust in order to secure the decedent's obligations under a
postdivorce settlement agreement between the decedent and his former wife); Lackey v. Lackey,
691 So. 2d 990, 995 (Miss. 1997) (trust beneficiary entitled to have constructive trust imposed
on proceeds of life insurance policy purchased with property embezzled from trust). See
generally BOGERT, supra note 75, §473, at 67 (Fraudulent Misrepresentation or Concealment),
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constructive trustee has an affirmative duty to transfer the legal title to
the person wronged and, until that is accomplished, a duty not to
harm, or allow others to harm, the property. The fiduciary or
fiduciary-like powers of a proprietary remedial constructive trustee
are generally not disclaimable.20 6
Is the proprietary remedial constructive trust a true trust? The
Restatement of Restitution (1937) answers with a resounding "no
way!" 20 7 This has come to be known as the American view. 2 08 The
proprietary remedial constructive trust is an involuntary arrangement,
or so the reasoning goes, whereas the express trust is the product of
the voluntary reordering of rights, duties and obligations with respect
to property. 209 The trustee of an express trust, it is asserted, is a
fiduciary; the trustee of a proprietary remedial constructive trust is
not. 2 10 The proprietary remedial constructive trust, as is the case with
the compensatory remedial constructive trust, is just a remedy,
Equity's answer to the law's quasi-contract.2 11 1937 marks the year
when the constructive trust was formally "lopped off" from the
Restatement of Trusts and "folded into" the Restatement of
Restitution. 2 12
The Restatement of Restitution's authors, however, did concede
"that both in the case of an express trust and in that of a constructive
trust one person holds the title to property subject to an equitable duty
to hold the property for or to convey it to another, and the latter has in
each case some kind of an equitable interest in the property. ,,213
Moreover, they offered no explanation for why, as a matter of public
policy or otherwise, the involuntariness of a proprietary remedial
constructive trust should make it something other than a true trust.
Just because a duck has been artificially inseminated does not make it
any less of duck.214 Can it really be said that the proprietary remedial
§ 474 (Mistake,

Undue Influence, and Duress).
206. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-1102 cmt. (amended 2006), (Uniform Disclaimer of
Property Interests Act does not cover constructive trusts).
207. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160, cmt. a (1937).
208. HANBURY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 44, at 310-311 (the American view); LEWIN ON
TRUSTS, supra note 105, at 1 7-13, at 188 (the "purely remedial" trust as a "North American"
invention).
209. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160, cmt. a (1937).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Kull, supra note 125, at 92.
213.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

§ 160, cmt. a, at 641

(1937).

214. The English would agree. See generally LEWIN ON TRUSTS, supra note 105, at T 7-13,
at 188 ("Remedial constructive trusts can be subdivided into proprietary and compensatory
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constructive trustee of X's property owes X no fiduciary duties?
While it would go too far to suggest that a proprietary remedial
constructive trustee without notice has a duty to invest the subject
property, or should be held "to the usual standard of exacta diligentia
which is required of express trustees in the performance of their
duties," at minimum, the proprietary remedial constructive trustee
will have a duty to get title and possession safely into the hands of its
rightful owner, as would be the case with the trustee of a trust that has

terminated.2 15
The proprietary remedial constructive trust and the express trust
share other critical characteristics as well. A proprietary remedial
constructive trustee, for example, may be entitled to indemnity from
the subject property for the costs and expenses he incurs in obtaining
the property, or in effecting improvements that benefit the property.216
For, he who seeks equity, in this case the one is seeks the imposition
of a constructive trust, must do equity. Certainly, English law is not in
accord with the American view. Under English law, the proprietary
remedial constructive trust still enjoys the status of a "substantive
institution."2 17 It has been asserted that since 1937 no one has
considered any constructive trust a part of the law of trusts.218 This
may be the case, but only on this side of the Atlantic.
Not only is the argument that the proprietary remedial
constructive trust is something other than a true trust less than
compelling, so also is the logic that it is an equitable remedy. It would
seem that the proprietary remedial constructive trust is imposed to
facilitate the fashioning of an equitable remedy, such as restitution.
Having allowed the person wronged to trace a particular item of
property, and having imposed a proprietary remedial constructive
trust upon it, the court then fashions whatever remedies are
appropriate to make the beneficiary whole.219 Still, the imposition of a
proprietary remedial constructive trust on traceable property is a
remedy in the sense that it freezes the status quo, that is, it prevents
the transferee from consuming the property or passing it on to third
parties. In that sense, it is an equitable remedy.

remedial constructive trusts, to which may be added a transatlantic purely remedial trust, which
has not yet reached ... [England's] .. . shores").

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

See HANBuRY & MAUDSLEY, supra note 44, at 308-309.
LEWIN ON TRUSTS, supra note 105, at T21-21.
HANBuRy & MAUDSLEY, supranote 44, at 311.
Kull, supra note 125, at 92.
See generally LoRING AND ROuNDS, supra note 40, § 7.2.3.1.
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As an aside, the U.S. Supreme Court in the Root case ruled out
the IP infringer being an institutionalconstructive trustee:
The case is not within the principle, according to which, in certain
circumstances, a court of equity decrees a wrong-doer to be a
trustee de son tort, and exerts its jurisdiction over him in that
character. Where a defendant has wrongfully intermeddled with
property already impressed with a trust, he may be required as a
trustee to account for it.220
Be that as it may, one who wrongfully infringes upon X's IP
rights holds those rights for the benefit of X 22 1. All profits must be
accounted for. If the infringer is not a true trustee, it is in name only;
if the infringer is not a fiduciary, it is in name only, as well.
4.

Accounting actions against self dealing trustees

A trustee who improperly self deals may be compelled in an
action to account to disgorge any net profits that are incident to the
transaction.22 2 For purposes of computing equitable restitution
damages, the infringer of IP rights is deemed a defalcating trustee of
an express trust, or a proprietary remedial constructive trustee.223
a. Assessing a self-dealing trustee's liability and setoff rights.
If the trustee of an express trust self-deals with trust property in
breach of trust, the trustee is chargeable with any resulting loss or
depreciation in the value of the property.2 24 On the other hand, the
trustee is chargeable with any profit the trustee makes on the
transaction, or any profit that would have accrued to the trust estate
had there not been a breach.225 Thus, if a trustee borrows property
from the trust estate at one rate of interest and lends it to a third party
at a higher rate of interest, the trust estate is entitled to the benefit of

220. Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 215 (1881).
221. Seelnfrap.7.
222. See 4 ScoTr & ASCHER, supra note 80, § 24.13 (discussing trustee's liability
resulting from transaction.); See generally LORING AND ROUNDS, supra note 40, § 6.1.3 (the
trustee's duty of loyalty).
223.
See Root, 105 U.S. at 214; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT §43 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
224. See generally 4 ScoTT & ASCHER, supra note 80, § 24.13 (discussing trustee's
liability for breach of trust by purchasing property).
225. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 206 cmt. a (1959). See generally BOGERT,
supra note 75 §543 (1984) (Measure of Damages); 4 Scorr & ASCHER, supra note 80, § 24.9
(electing to hold trustee accountable for profits that have accrued as a result of breach).
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the spread.22 6 The trustee will hold the profit upon a constructive trust
for the benefit of the trust estate.227 In that case, until the profit is
disgorged, there are effectively two trusts, the constructive trust and
the express trust. The Restatement of Restitution (1937) is in accord
with these general principles: "Where a fiduciary in violation of his
duty to the beneficiary receives or retains a bonus or commission or
other profit, he holds what he receives upon a constructive trust for
the beneficiary."22 8
Even the trustee who wrongfully self deals, however, may have
set-off rights against the trust estate. Take, for example, a trust of real
estate that is the subject of a $10,000 first mortgage and a $5,000
second. The trustee purchases with the trustee's own funds the second
mortgage for $3000. At foreclosure, the real estate is sold for
$16,000. While the trustee is not entitled to profit from the
transaction, the trustee may well be entitled to be reimbursed from the
proceeds of the sale for the $3,000 that was paid for the second
mortgage, plus interest on the amount. 22 9 What is left over from the
proceeds would accrue to the trust estate. Likewise, if a patent right is
exploited without leave of the patentee, the infringer under trust
principles may well still be entitled to an off-set for the personal
"capital" that the infringer deployed to affect the infringement.230
b. Assessing the IP infringer'sanalogous liability
The Restatement of Restitution (1937) provides that a person
who tortiously exploits the IP rights of another is under a duty of
restitution for the value of the benefit thereby received. 2 3 1 The
Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, currently a work
in progress, is more or less in accord. It would go on, however, to
address what ought to be the appropriate measure of recovery when
the infringer's conduct is "blameworthy" and when it is not: "A
conscious wrongdoer, or one who acts despite a known risk that the

226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 206 crnt. j (1959); 4 SCOTT & ASCHER, supra
note 80, § 24.7.
227. LEWIN ON TRUSTS, supra note 105, 120-32 ("But if the trustee's personal use of the
trust property results in both a profit to the trustee and a loss in respect of the beneficiaries being
deprived of the use of the property, the beneficiaries cannot recover both the profit and the
loss.").
228.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

§ 197

(1937).

229. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §206, cmt. h, illus. 5 (1959).
230. See, e.g., Christensen v. National Brake & Electric Co., 10 F.2d 856, 861-862 (E.D.
Wis. 1926).
231.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

§

136 (1937).
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conduct in question violates the rights of the claimant, will be
required to disgorge all gains (including consequential gains) derived
from the wrongful transaction." 2 32 The innocent or negligent
infringer, on the other hand, need only disgorge the direct benefit.2 3
"Direct benefit may be measured, where such a measurement is
available and appropriate, by a reasonable royalty or by the
reasonable cost of a license."234 In either case, the claimant would
have a right to elect either an assessment-of-damages remedy or a
disgorgement-of-infringer's profits remedy.2 35 "To the extent that the
defendant's profits from infringement represent profits the plaintiff
would otherwise have earned, the calculation of 'infringer's profits'
becomes an indirect mode of showing 'plaintiffs damages', and the
same amount might be recovered under either heading-subject to
protection against double-counting." 2 3 6
The Third Restatement would purport to present a current
statement of the background common law of restitution for unjust
enrichment, the term common law being employed here in its
broadest sense. Contextualizing the myriad state and Federal statutes
that regulate IP rights infringement is a worthy undertaking:
"Restitution principles serve to illuminate legislative purpose; to
identify the points at which a given statute varies a rule that would
otherwise obtain at common law; and as an aid to interpretation of a
doubtful case." 237 The traditional Equitable Remedies course, which
covered critical foundational doctrine, needs to be revived and reinstated on the required side of the American law school curriculum.
The Australians are way ahead of us in this regard. 238
i. The IP infringer's net profit
In the case of disgorgement of benefits incident to an IP rights
infringement, Equity seeks to "strip the wrongdoer of net gain
attributable to the wrong-because disgorgement in excess of net gain

232.

RESTATEMENT

(THIRD)

OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 42(2)(a)

(Tentative. Draft No. 4, 2005).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. § 42 cmt. d.
236. Id.
237. Id. at cmt. a, at 86.
238. At the School of Law and Management, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia,
for example, the Law of Equity and Trusts is a required course. See La Trobe University, CLE
(last
http://www.latrobe.edu.aullawman/about/schools/law/cle-requirements
Requirements,
visited Mar.14, 2010).
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would be punitive, as would disgorgement of gains derived from
legitimate sources." 2 39 Thus, what may or may not be deducted from
gross receipts is likely to be a critical issue in any IP infringement
case. "The need to establish the wrongful derivation of the
defendant's profits requires the court to identify the contribution to
defendant's overall profits (or to some meaningful subdivision
thereof) attributable to the wrong." 2 40 This is easier said than done:
When a profitable, unauthorized use has been made of another's
intellectual property or similar rights, the interests in question have
typically been used to create new values combining disparate and
largely incommensurable elements. Determining the net profits
attributable to the product in question-as distinct from the
defendant's other sources of income-may be difficult in itself,
particularly if defendant's business enterprise is complex.
Assuming that a figure for the relevant net profits may be
determined, the court confronts the further difficulty of deciding
what portion thereof should be attributed to the defendant's
interference with the plaintiff s legally protected interests.241
In any case, there needs to be a provable link between the
infringement and the ill-gotten profits. "Where the connection
between profits and infringement is merely speculative, or can be
logically excluded, recovery will be denied." 24 2
ii. The IP infringer's right to counter-restitution
is grounded in trust law as informed by
Equity's application of the law of unjust
enrichment
It is black letter law that if a trustee incurs an expense incident to
an unauthorized self dealing transaction, and in so doing confers upon
the trust estate a benefit, the trustee is ordinarily entitled to indemnity
to the extent of the benefit of the value conferred.24 3 He who seeks
equity must do equity. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts is generally
in accord. 24 Under the Uniform Trust Code, a trustee is entitled to be

239.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 42,

cmt. h

(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
240. Id.
Id.
241.
242. Id.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 245 cmts. c-d (1959). See also LEWIN ON
243.
TRUSTS, supra note 105, at 21-25, at 539-40; 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT &

ASCHER
244.

(2009); 4 ScoTT & ASCHER, supra note 80, §22.2.1.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 88, crnt. a (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).

§ 18.1.2.6
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reimbursed out of the trust property, with interest as appropriate,
expenses that were not properly incurred in the administration of the
trust to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the
trust. 245 "Given this purpose, a court, on appropriate grounds, may
delay or even deny reimbursement for expenses which benefited the
trust." 24 6 As a deemed express trustee or proprietary remedial
constructive trustee, the infringer of IP rights in certain cases also has
an equitable right of indemnity.
Whether it is the case of the trustee of an express trust who has
engaged in unauthorized self dealing or the proprietary remedial
constructive trustee of someone else's IP rights, this equitable right of
indemnity is grounded in Equity's contribution to the law of unjust
enrichment, specifically the equitable right of counter-restitution. The
court in equity is loath to fashion a remedy that leaves either party
unjustly enriched.247 The Restatement of Restitution is in full accord:
"Where the right to restitution is dependent upon restoration by the
person seeking restitution, he cannot enforce a constructive trust
without making restoration."248 In the Comment thereto relating to
reimbursement for expenditures on the improvement of property
unjustifiably acquired, there is a culpability exception: One who
acquires property by fraud, for example, may well not be entitled to
249
In any case, just as the trustee of an express
counter-restitution.
trust must substantiate any claims for indemnity, so too the burden is
on the IP rights infringer to prove all offsets for counter-restitution.2 50
In the context of IP rights infringement, the practical mechanics
of equitable indemnity or counter-restitution can be mind-boggling. In
his Counting the Beans: Unjust Enrichment and the Defendant's

245. UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 709(a)(2) (2005). See generally 4 ScoTT & ASCHER, supra
note 80, §22.2.1.
246. UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 709 cmt. (2005). "Appropriate grounds ... [for delay or
even denying reimbursement for expenses which benefited the trust] ... include: (1) whether the
trustee acted in bad faith in incurring the expense; (2) whether the trustee knew that the expense
was inappropriate; (3) whether the trustee reasonably believed the expense was necessary for the
preservation of the trust estate; (4) whether the expense has resulted in a benefit; and (5)
whether indemnity can be allowed without defeating or impairing the purposes of the trust." Id.
247. Roach, supra note 6, at 511. See, e.g., Christensen v. National Brake & Electric Co,
10 F.2d 856, 862 (1926) (noting that equity is loath to fashion a remedy that is "punitive").
248.

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION

§ 177 (1937).

RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 177 cmt. c, (1937). See also RESTATEMENT
249.
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 cmt. e(4) (Tentative Draft No. 5,

2007) (carrying over the fraud exception).
250.

Roach, supra note 6, at 516. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION

AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§42,

cmt. h (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
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Overhead, for example, George P. Roach explores the question of
whether and to what extent an IP infringer is entitled to an offset for
its fixed costs. 25 1 "The federal circuits are roughly split between
supporters of the full-absorption approach, who advocate offsetting
allocations of attributable fixed costs (principally, the First, Second,
and Ninth Circuits), and advocates of the incremental income
approach who exclude allocations of fixed costs (principally, the
Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits)." 2 52
iii. The anti-netting rule applicable to IP rights
infringers is borrowed lock, stock, and barrel
from trust law
It is black letter law that "[a] trustee who is liable for a loss
caused by a breach of trust may not reduce the amount of the liability
by deducting the amount of profit that accrued through another and
distinct breach of trust." 253 This is known as the anti-netting rule.2 5 4 If
the breaches of trust, however, are not separate and distinct, the
trustee is accountable only for the net gain or chargeable only with the
net loss resulting therefrom. 2 55 Without the anti-netting rule, a trustee
under certain circumstances might be inclined to commit multiple
breaches of trust: "For example, the trustee whose misconduct has
caused a loss may take improper risks in pursuit of extra profits if
those profits may serve to eliminate or reduce the amount of expected
surcharge."2 56 In the context of trust law, "the profit from a breach of
trust is the amount by which the value of the beneficiaries' interests
exceeds what the value of those interests would have been if the trust
had been properly administered."2 57
In the context of IP infringement, "separate infringements that
produce negative results do not have to be accumulated in the
measure of the defendant's profit or benefit." 25 8 This is an equitable
application of the anti-netting rule. It has been applied by courts in the
IP infringement context, 25 9 but generally without direct attribution to
251.
252.

Roach, supra note 6, at 485.
Id.

253.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 213 (1990).

254.

Loren C. Ipsen, Trends in the Liability of CorporateFiduciaries,24 IDAHO L. REV.

443,450 (1989).

§ 213 (1990).

255.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS

256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. § 213 cmt. f.
Id. § 213 cmt. b.
Roach, supra note 6, at 522.
See, e.g., Black & Decker, Inc. v. Pro-Tech Power, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 834, 856
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any core doctrine.260 Implicitly, however, the courts are analogizing to
the law of trusts.2 61 Again, it is time for the American law school to
go back to the future and reinstate Trusts as a required course. It is a
relationship that is marbled throughout the common law as enhanced
by Equity, as well as invoked in a panoply of critical statutory and
regulatory regimes.
CONCLUSION
This article has examined the equitable remedy of restitution for
unjust enrichment in the IP rights infringement context. Instruction in
Equity's "notion" of unjust enrichment and the remedy for it was
once standard fare in the American law school. That is no longer the
case, even though "[a]s the American economy completes its
transition to a data economy, unjust enrichment in equity will
increasingly become the principal remedy to protect economic
interests." 2 62 Law school-sponsored litigation clinics are fine, but not
at the expense of imparting basic doctrine. Though this primer covers
critical common law doctrine that every IP rights litigator needs to
have internalized, the term "common law" being employed broadly in
juxtaposition to the civil law tradition, it is no substitute for
systematic instruction in Equity's institutions and remedies, the core
fiduciary relationships of agency and trust, and the fiduciary principle
generally. Particularly in the IP rights infringement context,
"restitution principles serve to illuminate legislative purpose; to
identify the points at which a given statute varies a rule that would
otherwise obtain at common law; and as an aid to interpretation of a

doubtful case." 2 6 3

(E.D. Va. 1998) (invoking the anti-netting rule in calculating trademark/ trade dress
infringement damages: "Given that the calculations of damages rests on equitable
considerations, the Court will not allow Pro-Tech to offset the profits it made in 1995, 1995
[sic], 1997, and 1998 by is losses in 1993 and 1996").
260. See generally Roach, supra note 6.
Id. at 522-25.
261.
262. See generally Id.
263.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).

§ 42,

cmt. a
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